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THE SOUTHERN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS'
CONSTITUTIONAL CARD: UTILIZATION
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
DONALD R. LIVINGSTONt
Southern public employee labor unions have been frustrated in
their efforts to serve their members because of generally unfavorable
legislation and court decisions. One bright spot in southern public sec-
tor labor relations, however, has been labor's recent success in pressing
equal protection claims. In this Article, Mr. Livingston examines this
use of the equal protection clause and concludes that the clause may
help public employee labor unions secure rights not otherwise available
to them under state laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
The laws of the various southern states traditionally have provided little
support, by way of favorable legislation, to public employee labor organiza-
tions. Although some southern states have enacted statutes granting bargain-
ing rights to a select group or groups of public employees,' only Florida has
enacted broad legislation designed to promote collective bargaining between
local governments and labor organizations representing public employees.
2
One southern state, North Carolina, has enacted legislation declaring that con-
tracts between governmental units and public employee labor unions are ille-
gal.3 In other southern states where these contracts are not specifically made
illegal, the courts have consistently ruled that, absent clear statutory authority
to the contrary, collective bargaining agreements between labor unions and
governmental units are of no force and effect.4 Thus, while public employees
t Member, Adair & Goldthwaite, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Member Georgia Bar. A.B. 1974,
J.D. 1977, University of Georgia.
1. For example, Alabama gives firefighters the right to have their chosen representative
present proposals to city governments relating to salaries and other conditions of employment,
ALA. CODE § 11-43-143(b) (1975). This right, however, does not include the right to negotiate
enforceable agreements. Nichols v. Bolding, 291 Ala. 50, 277 So.2d 868 (1973). Georgia also
extends collective bargaining rights to firefighters. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-1301 to -1314 (1974).
Louisiana requires public transportation systems to bargain collectively with employees through
labor unions authorized to act for such employees. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:890 (West Supp.
1980). Tennessee allows contract negotiations between boards of education and professional em-
ployee organizations representing teachers. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49 -5501 to -5516 (Cum. Supp.
1979); and extends collective bargaining rights to public transit employees. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 7-56-102 (1980). See generally Beaird, Public Employee Labor Relations in the Southeast-An
Historical Perspective, this symposium.
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 447.201 to .609 (Harrison 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
3. Law of June 4, 1959, ch. 742, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 731 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 95-98 (1975)). For a comprehensive examination of this statute and the North Carolina law
dealing with public employee labor relations, see Comment, Public Employee Bargaining in North
Carolina From Paternalism to Confusion, this symposium.
4. See Engineers Local 321 v. Water Works Bd., 276 Ala. 462, 163 So.2d 619 (1964); Miami
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are free to join the labor organizations of their choice,5 their efforts at unioni-
zation are frustrated because the southern states typically afford public em-
ployee labor unions little freedom to exercise the functions traditionally
associated with "unionism." Further frustrating efforts of southern public em-
ployee unions is the express exclusion of state and municipal governing bodies
or agencies from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act,6 which
grants rights to unions in the private sector.
Despite the general absence of legislation favorable to public employee
unions in the South, southern public employee unions did achieve modest con-
cessions through the courts during the 1970s by basing legal arguments upon
certain guarantees of the Bill of Rights. This was possible because labor dis-
putes that might be commonplace in the private sector, and controlled by fed-
eral labor legislation, often become constitutional litigation in the public sector
because public employers are involved rather than private entities. One of the
constitutional provisions being explored successfully by the public employee
unions is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 Through
use of equal protection arguments, southern public employee unions have
been able to secure rights not otherwise available to them under state laws.
This Article will examine some of the instances in which southern public
employee labor unions have used the equal protection clause in their quest for
rights and privileges. The article is not designed to bring into focus the legal
niceties of equal protection. Rather, it is intended to show that, under certain
circumstances, public employee unions may be able to use the equal protection
clause to achieve their goals when other avenues of judicial redress are un-
available.
Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); City of Belleview v.
Belleview Fire Fighters, 367 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Dade County v. Amalgamated
Ass'n. of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), appeal
dismissed, 166 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied. 379 U.S. 971 (1965); International Longshore-
men's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports Auth., 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d 733, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962);
City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 676, 24 So. 2d 319 (1946); City of Alcoa v. Electrical Work-
ers Local 760, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957); Weakley County Mun. Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 43
Tenn. App. 524, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957), cert denied, 41 L.R.R.M. 2639 (Tenn. 1958) (but see
Moberly, Public Sector Labor Relations Law in Tennessee: The Current Inadequacies and theA vail-
able41ternatives, 42 TENN. L. REv. 235 (1973), noting that the prohibition against a public em-
ployer entering into a collective bargaining agreement with a union in the above cited Tennessee
cases is dicta); Commonwealth v. County Bd., 217 Va. 558, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977).
5. The public employee can associate freely under the first amendment and is protected
from retaliation for doing so. Lontine v. VanCleave, 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973); Vorbeck v.
McNeal, 407 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo.), aft'd, 426 U.S. 943 (1976); Melton v. City of Atlanta, 324 F.
Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). f.,
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968) (teacher's exercise of first amendment
right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish basis for dismissal from public
employment); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (statute requiring disclosure by teachers of
all organizations with which they were associated as condition of employment was an invalid
infringement of right of free association).
6. See Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
7. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW-A GENERAL LOOK
The equal protection clause itself provides no substantive rights to a pub-
lic employee labor organization or to its members. Under some circum-
stances, however, the clause precludes a governmental entity, such as a state or
city, from discriminating among various public employee labor organizations
that have members who are employed by the entity. While a southern public
employee labor union may have no right per se to such things as the checkoff
of union dues8 or an arrangement to "meet and confer" with a governmental
entity over personnel policies affecting its members, 9 these things may become
available to the union as a matter of right under the equal protection clause if
the entity affords these benefits to another labor organization representing its
employees.10
The unequal treatment of labor organizations by a governmental unit,
however, in itself does not determine the question of constitutionality under
the equal protection clause. A statute or a governmental action that distin-
guishes among public sector labor organizations and their respective members
generally will violate the constitutional requirements of equal protection only
if the government's classification is "without any reasonable basis."" This
"reasonable basis" test is commonly referred to as the "traditional standard"
of equal protection analysis. Under this standard, the equal protection clause
is breached only if a government's distinction between its citizens rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate governmental
objective.' 2 When a government's classification interferes with the exercise of
a fundamental right, 13 or operates to the particular disadvantage of a suspect
class,14 however, the traditional standard will not apply, and the constitution-
8. Dues check-off is the deduction of union dues by the employer from the paycheck of the
employee union member with the approval of the employee.
9. When a "meet and confer" arrangement exists, discussions between a union and an em-
ployer are only advisory. These discussions often take place with multiple employee representa-
tives rather than with an exclusive bargaining agent. One commentator has noted that "critics of
the 'meet and confer' model argue that it forces a union to engage in 'collective begging."' Ed-
wards, 4n overview of the "Meet and Confer" States-Where Are We Going, LAW QUADRANGLE
NOTES, Winter 1972, at 10.
10. See Truck Drivers Local 728 v. City of Atlanta, 468 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (union
obtained "dues check-off'); O'Brien v. Leidinger, 452 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Va. 1978) (union ob-
tained right to "meet and confer").
11. Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
12. See, eg., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
13. Among such fundamental rights are privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); voting,
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and
speech, Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
14. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973). Suspect classi-
fications include alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); race, McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); and ancestry, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). A suspect class
is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
1980]
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ality of the classification must be judged by the stricter standard of whether
the classification promotes a compelling governmental interest.15 Distinctions
made between public employee labor unions may be subject to either the
traditional or the compelling interest standard depending upon whether the
classification impairs a fundamental right.
16
III. THE BATTLE GROUND
A. Right to Checkoff of Union Dues
1. Truck Drivers Union Local 728 v. City of Atlanta 17
In 1977, Local 728, Truck Drivers and Helpers Union brought suit
against Atlanta, Georgia, alleging that the city violated the equal protection
rights of the union's members by refusing to withhold for the union the dues of
its members who were city policemen while withholding dues for the union
representing city firefighters.' 8 The district court, in Truck Drivers Union Lo-
cal 728 v. City ofAtlanta, considered the constitutionality of the city's practice
under the traditional equal protection standard. Under that standard, the
city's distinction between policemen and firefighters would survive the union's
challenge only if it was reasonably related to the furtherance of a legitimate
governmental interest. 19 The court applied the traditional standard rather
than requiring a showing of a compelling governmental interest because a
city's refusal to check off union dues for policemen involves neither a "funda-
mental right" 20 nor a "suspect class" 21 requiring strict scrutiny of the govern-
ment's purposes for differentiating among public employee organizations.
22
Atlanta attempted to justify the line it drew between police employees
and other city workers on the ground that a police union presented a threat to
both public safety and to property within the city.23 The court, however, not-
ing that both Atlanta's policemen and firefighters have a duty to protect life
and property, could find no reasonable basis for a distinction between police-
men and firefighters24 based upon the city's protection of life and property
15. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
16. See University ofMo. v. Dalton, 456 F. Supp. 985, 997 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (Absent a "com-
pelling state interest," once a state university provides the use of its facilities to faculty organiza-
tions, it cannot refuse to grant the use of the facilities to one particular faculty organization
because that organization promotes collective bargaining.).
17. 468 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1979), appealdocketed, No. 79-2247 (5th Cir. May 24, 1979),
remanded, Sept. 17, 1980.
18. Id. at 621.
19. Id. at 623.
20. See City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283, 286 (1976).
21. See id.; Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 520 F.2d 993, 1001 (5th Cir. 1975). In
Firefighters Local 2069 v. City of Sylacauga, 436 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ala. 1977), it was stated that
"[a] classification involving a distinction between policemen and firemen has never, to the court's
knowledge, been subject to the strict scrutiny afforded suspect classifications." 436 F. Supp. at
489.
22. 468 F. Supp. at 623.
23. Id.
24. The dangerous nature of police work, however, has been found to establish a reasonable
basis for distinguishing between policemen and city workers other than firefighters. In Confedera-
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rationale.25 The court rejected the claim "that the police in a unique way and
through individual discretionary decisions protect life and personal security
while the fire department only operates on a team basis to protect property
and, on occasion, life."
26
Because the city's differential classification of policemen and firefighters
was without a reasonable basis, the court enjoined the city from withholding
from plaintiffs access to the privilege of union dues checkoff.27 Thus, a union
representing certain police officers of Atlanta obtained the valuable right to
have union dues withheld by the city, for the benefit of the labor organization,
through utilization of the equal protection clause.
28
2. City of Charlotte v. Local 660, International Association of Firfghters29
The holding in City of Atlanta, while a clear victory for southern public
employee labor unions, must be read narrowly. The case stands for the propo-
sition that a unit of government cannot refuse to check off union dues for
employees within one of its departments while extending that privilege to em-
ployees within another department when no reasonable basis exists for treat-
ing the groups differently. The United States Supreme Court's decision in City
of Charlotte v. Local 660, International Associaton of Firefighters3° precludes a
more expansive interpretation of City of Atlanta. In City of Charlotte the
Supreme Court held that it is not an equal protection violation for a city to
refuse to check off union dues for firefighters while withholding moneys from
firefighters' paychecks for payment to various other organizations when the
city's classification reasonably constitutes a legitimate method of avoiding the
financial and administrative burden of withholding money for all organiza-
tions requesting it.31
tion of Police v. City of Chicago, 382 F. Supp. 624, 630 (N.D. Ill.), rev'don other grounds, 529 F.2d
89 (7th Cir.), vacated, 427 U.S. 902 (1976), the court found that a reasonable basis exists for
providing library workers, but not policemen, collective bargaining rights and a formal grievance
procedure because police work is "dangerous and important to the public's welfare." See also
Vorbeck v. McNeal, 407 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aft'd, 426 U.S. 943 (1976) (Police officers
occupy such a unique place in society that their exclusion from a public employee "meet and
confer" statute has a rational relation to a legitimate objective of the state.).
25. 468 F. Supp. at 623.
26. .d. at 623-24.
27. Id. at 624.
28. The benefit, however, was short-lived. Following the district court's decision, the Atlanta
City Council passed an ordinance removing the firefighters from access to dues checkoff. CITY OF
ATLANTA, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 7-1033 (1980). This, in effect, dissipated the city's infringe-
ment upon the equal protection rights of the policemen. For a discussion of Atlanta's history with
dues checkoff for public employee labor unions, see Yancy, Public Sector Bargaining in the South:
A Case Study of Atlanta and Memphis, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH Assoc. SERIES, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANN. MEETING, December 28-30, 1979, at 303-05.
29. 426 U.S. 283 (1976).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 288. See, also, Bauch v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 237 N.E.2d 211, 289
N.Y.S.2d 951 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1969) in which the court held that it is not an
equal protection violation for a city to checkoff dues only for a labor organization certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent for all city employees within a department. Id. at 606, 237 N.E.2d at
214, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 955. The court held that a city has a legitimate interest in the maintenance of
stability in the relations between the city and employee organizations as well as in the avoidance
1980]
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City of Charlotte began in 1973 when Local 660 of the International Asso-
ciation of Firefighters brought suit against Charlotte, North Carolina, alleging
that the city's refusal to check off union dues from the paychecks of city-em-
ployed union members while checking off, on request, monies to be paid to
various charities, government subdivisions, private insurance companies, and
other beneficiaries, violated the equal protection clause.3 2 The district court
determined that the city allowed a checkoff when required by law, when the
checkoff option was available to all city employees, or when the checkoff op-
tion was available to all employees within a single employee unit such as the
Fire Department.33 The city did not allow checkoff options serving only single
employees or programs that were not available either to all city employees or
to all employees engaged in a particular section of city government.3 4 The
court noted that the city suggested neither a compelling state interest in refus-
ing to withhold moneys for the benefit of Local 660 nor any rational basis for
the refusal.35 The court further found no difference in the state interest in-
volved in the various payroll deductions that justified the discriminatory with-
holding policy.36 The court, therefore, held that the city's refusal to check off
union dues constituted a violation of the individual plaintiff's rights to equal
protection of the laws.37 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's order.
38
In 1976 the Supreme Court found that a reasonable basis existed for the
city's classification and reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit.39 The
Court reasoned that the city's practice need only meet the standard of reasona-
bleness to survive constitutional scrutiny because neither the firefighter's status
as union members nor their interest in obtaining a dues checkoff entitled them
to special treatment under the equal protection clause.40 The Court ruled that
the city's practice of allowing withholding only when it benefited all city or
of devastating work stoppages. Id. at 607, 237 N.E.2d at 214, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 955. The city's
practice of checking off union dues only for the certified bargaining representative of all employ-
ees within a unit was, according to the court, reasonably related to the city's legtimate purposes.
Id. Unlike New York in the Bauch case, Atlanta did not recognize labor unions as exclusive
bar/aining agents of city employees. The courts consistently have found a reasonable basis for
distinguishing between two public employee unions when the union being extended special privi-
leges has been recognized by the governmental unit as the exclusive bargaining agent for certaingovernment employees. See Memphis Fed'n of Teachers Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d
699(6th Cir. 1976); Federation of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385 (D.Del. 1971) (distinction satisfied even a compelling state interest); Local 858, Am. Fed'n of Teach-
ers v. School District No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970) (distinction satisfied even a compel.
ling state interest.
32. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Charlotte, 381 F. Supp. 500 (,.D.N.C.
1974), ajt'd, 518 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1975); rev'd, 426 U.s. 283 (1976).
33. Id. at 502.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 503.
37. Id. at 502-03.
38. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Charlotte, 518 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 283 (1976).39. City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976).
40. Id. at 286.
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departmental employees was a reasonable method for furthering the city's le-
gitimate objective of avoiding the unduly burdensome and expensive task of
withholding money for all persons or organizations that requested it.41 On
this point, the Court stated:
We cannot say that denying withholding to associational or special
interest groups that claim only some departmental employees as
members and that employees must first join before being eligible to
participate in the checkoff marks an arbitrary line so devoid of rea-
son as to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, this division
seems a reasonable method for providing the benefit of withholding
to employees in their status as employees, while limiting the number
of instances of withholding and the financial and administrative bur-
dens attendant thereon.
42
City of Charlotte and City of Atlanta both apply a pragmatic approach to
the equal protection problem. Whether a city's dues check-off policy violates
equal protection depends upon a court's determination whether the distinction
made by the city between similar organizations is reasonably related to a legit-
imate governmental objective. Undoubtedly, Atlanta's stated objective, to in-
sure the safety of persons and property within its limits, was a legitimate one.
However, the city sought to further that objective by denying checkoff of
union dues to policemen while providing it to firefighters who also have a duty
to protect life and property. Therefore, the city discriminated between two
similarly situated groups. In City of Charlotte, on the other hand, none of the
organizations permitted the privilege of checkoff were situated as closely to the
plaintiff Firefighters Union as were the firefighters to the police in City of At-
lanta. In City of Atlanta the city discriminated among various public em-
ployee groups. This discrimination between different groups of employees did
not exist in City of Charlotte. Unless disparate treatment is dealt to similarly
situated groups, an equal protection violation will not exist.43 The more two
groups are alike, the harder it is for a court to find a reasonable basis for
distinguishing between them. Thus, while courts, like the court in City of At-
lanta, are hesitant to find a reasonable basis for distinguishing between police-
men and firefighters because of the similar nature of their work, they will more
41. Id. at 288. The court also noted that the city's policy of drawing and applying standards
in practice rather than pursuant to articulated guidelines was of no import for equal protection
purposes. Id. at 287.
42. Id. at 288. The Supreme Court's decision was followed in Local 995, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Richmond, 415 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Va. 1976).
43. In Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471 (2d
Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a governmental unit can defend
against an equal protection claim by making a preliminary showing that plaintiff is not similarly
situated to the group receiving special privileges. The Second Circuit stated:
[The public employer] might be able to make a threshold showing that there is no "dis-
crimination" because, as respects the purpose of the privileges granted, the... locals are
not similarly situated. This would be in accordance with the principle that the equal
protection clause does not deny to government the power to treat different classes in
different ways, but rather only denies government the power to accord different treat-
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easily find a reasonable basis for distinguishing between policemen or
firefighters and other city employees who do not have a public responsibility to
protect life and property.44
B. 'Meet and Confer" and Collective Bargaining Agreements
In 1975, in a situation similar to City of Atlanta, certain police officer
members of Teamsters Local No. 592 brought suit against the City Manager
and City Council of Richmond, Virginia.45 The officers alleged that the de-
fendants' refusal to enter into good faith discussions with the union concerning
police officers' wages, hours, working conditions, and grievances violated the
plaintiffs' equal protection rights because the city discussed these topics with
other local unions and representatives of various city employees.46 As in City
of Atlanta and City of Charlotte, the district court in O'Brien v. Leidinger
47
held that only a rational basis need exist for the city's disparate treatment of
these police employees. 48 However, the court ruled that plaintiffs "are not
bound to speculate as to possible explanations" for the city's classification and
refute each one.49 Rather, the court stated, the government has the burden of
offering its reason for treating members of the Teamsters Union differently
from members of other unions.50 Because the city failed to offer any reason
for differentiating between the unions,5 ' the court concluded that the city was
violating plaintiffs' rights to equal protection and that, therefore, plaintiffs had
a right to have the city discuss wages, hours, benefits, and grievances with
plaintiffs' labor union.
52
Although the plaintiffs in O'Brien had no right under Virginia law to
meet and confer with city officials over matters of employee concern, they ob-
tained this privilege for themselves and their union under the equal protection
clause because the city offered no reasonable basis for its policy of meeting
with other labor unions.
But in Beauboeuf v. Delgado College53 a Louisiana public employee
union did not fare as well. InDelgado the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a
44. See, e.g., Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 520 F.2d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 1975) (It is rea-
sonable to treat policemen and firemen in some respects differently from other employees because
of the nature of their work.); Confederation of Police v. City of Chicago, 382 F. Supp. 624 (N.D.
IlM. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 529 F.2d 89 (7th Cir.), vacated, 427 U.S. 902 (1976) (finding a
reasonable basis to distinguish between policemen and library workers).
45. O'Brien v. Leidinger, 452 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Va. 1978).
46. Id. at 722-23.
47. 452 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Va. 1978).
48. Id. at 723.
49. Id. at 724.
50. Id.
51. Following a motion by defendants to alter or amend the court's judgment, the court ex-
pressed its opinion that defendants' decision not to discuss wages, hours, and working conditions
with the Teamsters "was a deliberate, tactical action to discourage police officers from association
with Teamsters Local Union No. 592." O'Brien v. Leidinger, [1977-78] Pun. EMPL. BARO. (CCH)
91 36,343 (E.D. Va. 1978).
52. 452 F. Supp. at 724.
53. 428 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
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brief opinion in which it did not set forth its analysis of plaintiff's equal pro-
tection claim, upheld a district court decision rejecting the union's claim that it
was being unlawfully treated differently from other labor organizations.5 4 In
Delgado the American Federation of Teachers, Local 1130, charged that New
Orleans, Louisiana, denied it equal protection of the law when Delgado Col-
lege, an agency of the city, refused to enter into collective bargaining negotia-
tions with the union as agent for the school's faculty members.55 However, the
city bargained with labor unions representing other municipal employees.
56
The lower court noted that while a government official's action may con-
stitute a denial of equal protection when he or she grants rights to some and
denies them to others, the exercise of selectivity is not in itself a federal consti-
tutional violation.5 7 Then, without clearly articulating its standard of review,
the court stated that it is not unreasonable for a government to give special
consideration to its teachers.58 Apparently for that reason, the district court
held that it is not a violation of equal protection for a city to bargain with
unions representing employees other than teachers while refusing to bargain
collectively with a union representing some, but not all, of its teachers.
59
The district court in Delgado held that public school teachers, and the
public employee labor unions that represent them, may be classified differently
from other public employees and their unions for purposes of affording the
benefits of collective bargaining. Neither the district court nor the court of
appeals, however, made a step-by-step equal protection analysis that can be
used as guidance by other courts in examining future equal protection claims
by public employee unions.60 Consequently, this case has had little impact on
other southern equal protection cases involving public employee labor un-
ions.
6 1
C. Use of Facilities
A number of courts have been presented with the question whether a gov-
ernmental unit violates the equal protection clause by denying use of its facili-
ties to one public employee labor union while allowing a competing union to
54. Id. at 471.
55. Beauboeuf v. Dalgado College, 303 F. Supp. 861, 864-65 (E.D. La. 1969), a f'dper
curiam, 428 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1970).
56. The district court found that the city was meeting with representatives of the Teamsters
Union to frame a collective bargaining agreement covering sanitation workers; that the Sewage
and Water Board had entered into a collective bargaining contract with the American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees; and that the city had negotiated labor problems with
the Firefighters Union. Id. at 865.
57. Id. at 865-66.
58. Id. at 866.
59. Id.
60, The circuit court's discussion of the union's equal protection claim merely reads: "We
agree with the District Court that this case presents no cognizable issue of. . . equal protection."
428 F.2d at 471.
61. For example, the case is not cited in Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers Local 2032 v.
Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976); Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 520 F.2d 993 (5th
Cir. 1975), alf'don rehearing, 528 F.2d 499, vacated and remanded 438 U.S. 901 (1978); or O'Brien
v. Leidinger, 452 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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use the facilities. 62 These cases often involve a situation in which only one of
two competing teachers' unions is given the right to use school buildings for
meetings and school bulletin boards and mailboxes for communication with
the teachers.63 In Memphis American Federation of Teachers Local 2032 v.
Board of Education of Memphis City Schools,64 the issue before the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was whether the Memphis, Tennessee, Board of Educa-
tion violated the constitutional rights of the Memphis American Federation of
Teachers ("MAFT") by refusing to extend to it the same rights and privileges
previously granted by the Board to another organization of its professional
employees, the Memphis Education Association ("MEA").
65
In 1970 the Memphis Board of Education recognized MEA as the exclu-
sive representative of all professional personnel in the Memphis City
Schools.6 6 Following recognition, the Board granted MEA certain privileges
including the use of school bulletin boards, the use of school facilities for
meetings, and the use of interschool and intraschool mail services, including
faculty mailboxes. 67 MAFT was denied these privileges and, therefore, chal-
lenged on equal protection grounds the Board's policy of granting exclusive
privileges to MEA.
The Sixth Circuit ruled that the classification established by the Board
need satisfy only the reasonable basis test to survive the constitutional chal-
lenge.68 The court found that the "designation of MEA as authorized repre-
sentative of the professional employees in the Memphis school system and the
concomitant grant of certain privileges involved no .. .fundamental right
and did not involve a suspect class." 69 Recognizing that the goal of labor
peace and stability is a valid state objective, 70 the court held that the Board's
policy of recognizing and attempting to deal only with the union that had as its
members the majority of the Board's professional employees promoted this
goal.7 ' Consequently, the court held that the Board's practice of granting spe-
cial privileges exclusively to MEA was reasonably related to a valid state ob-
62. See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471
(2d Cir. 1976); Local 2032, Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534
F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976); University ofMo. v. Dalton, 456 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Federa-
tion of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del. 1971); Local 858,
Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970).
63. See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471
(2d Cir. 1976); Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 699 (6th
Cir. 1976); University of Mo. v. Dalton, 456 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Federation of Del.
Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del. 1971); Local 858, Am. Fed'n of
Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970).
64. 534 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976).
65. Id. at 700-01.
66. Id. at 701. At the time of the suit MEA had over 90% of the Board's professional employ-
ees in its membership. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 703.
69. Id See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.




jective and thus not violative of the equal protection clause.72
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Memphis City Schools is consistent with the
decisions of other federal courts that have upheld the affording of special priv-
ileges only to unions recognized as exclusive bargaining agents.73 The ration-
ale for distinguishing among public employee labor organizations in this
manner was developed in Local 858, American Federation of Teachers v.
School District No. 1,74 in which this classification was first challenged in the
federal court system. The court in Local 858 explained how this classification
furthers a legitimate government interest:
It allows the effective exercise of the right to form and join unions in
the context of public employment. It provides the duly elected repre-
sentative ready means of communicating with all teachers . . . . It
eliminates inter-union competition for membership within the public
schools except at time of representation elections. 75. . . Finally, all
of these benefits resulting from the grant of exclusive privileges to the
elected representative serve the principal policy of insuring labor
peace in public schools.
7 6
A violation of equal protection may occur, however, if a governmental
entity distinguishes between two public employee organizations in affording
one of them special access to the government's facilities when neither organi-
zation is recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for a group of the gov-
ernment's employees.77 Furthermore, if the only material distinction that can
be drawn between the favored employee organization and the other organiza-
72. Id.
73. See Federation of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del.
1971); Local 858, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970).
But see Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471 (2d Cir.
1976) (Second Circuit abstained from deciding the equal protection question, pending a definitive
determination of certain state law issues by a state tribunal).
While the decisions support the principle that exclusive privileges may be afforded unions
recognized as exclusive bargaining agents, there is some disagreement between the courts whether
the government's classification of unions for affording special privileges must be judged by the
stricter standard of equal protection. At least two courts have indicated that such a classification
must be necessary to further a compelling state interest because it infringes upon fundamental first
amendment activities. See Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538
F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1976); Federation of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp.
385 (Del. 1971).
74. 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970).
75. The court found that this benefit "has several salutary aspects:"
Orderly functioning of the schools as education institutions is insured through the limit-
ing of the time span when they may become a labor battlefield. The representative
union is not subject to competition within the schools, and thus is better able to function
as a representative, its efforts not spent in constant competition with the union that lost
the representation election. The fact that the representative's strength is not bled away
by such constant high intensity inter-union conflict allows public employees better repre-
sentation, providing a more beneficial exercise of the right of association.
Id. at 1076.
76. Id. "Labor peace means a continuity of ordered collective bargaining between school
officials and representatives of the teachers. It means a lowered incidence of labor conflict and
strife, thus insuring less interference with the functioning of the public schools as educational
institutions." Id.
77. See University of Mo. v. Dalton, 456 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
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tion is that the latter has as one of its goals collective bargaining with the
governmental entity while the former does not, the governmental entity must
offer a compelling state interest to justify its differing treatment of the two
organizations. 78 A decision to deny a public employee union the use of gov-
ernmental facilities because of the union's advocacy of collective bargaining
imposes impediments to the fundamental first amendment rights of free
speech and association 79 and therefore requires stricter scrutiny of the govern-
ment's classification.80 Thus, even though an employee organization may
have no independent "right" to use a government's facilities, the government
may not grant the use of a forum8' to groups whose views it finds acceptable,
but deny use of the forum to those wishing to express less favorable or more
controversial views, unless the distinction made by the government is tailored
to a substantial governmental interest.
8 2
IV. CONCLUSION
As the cases discussed demonstrate, the requirements of the equal protec-
tion clause have enabled certain southern public employee labor unions to
obtain a degree of viability and to fill some of the roles made available to
unions in the private sector by federal labor legislation but otherwise denied
public employees unions by state and local governments. The privileges that
southern public employee unions have obtained became available to them
when a government provided the privileges to other similarly situated organi-
zations without sufficient justification for not affording the same privileges to
the excluded labor organization. When a government does not grant special
privileges to any labor union, or similarly situated organization, a successful
equal protection claim cannot be made to obtain special privileges. Thus, a
government can insulate itself from having to provide privileges to a particular
public employee union by refusing to extend special privileges to any public
employee union or similar organization. 83 But if a large and politically pow-
erful public employee union is able to secure special privileges from a govern-
78. Id. at 997.
79. Id.
80. Cf. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) (ordinance restricting labor picket-
ing must "serve a substantial governmental interest"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969) (requirement of waiting period before eligibility for welfare benefits must "promote a com-
pelling governmental interest").
81. For example, governmental buildings for meetings, and bulletin boards and mail services
for communicating with public employees.
82. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). When a government's classification
infringes upon a first amendment right, equal protection claims become intertwined with first
amendment interests. The interconnection between these interests is discussed in Kalven, The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 29-30; Van Alstyne, Polit-
ical Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 328,
337-39 (1963).
83. For example, following the district court decision in Truck Drivers Local 728 v. City of
Atlanta, 468 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1979), holding that "[s]o long as [Atlanta] is willing to with-
hold dues from the firemen, it must, under the equal protection clause, make the option open to
police employees," the Atlanta City Council passed an ordinance removing firemen from access to
dues checkoff. CITY OF ATLANTA, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 7-1033 (1980).
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ment, other employee labor organizations may be able to secure these same
privileges by utilizing the equal protection clause.
Southern public employee labor unions only recently have been success-
ful in utilizing equal protection arguments. Consequently, the degree to which
the courts will sustain the equal protection challenges of public employee un-
ions remains to be seen. It can be assumed, however, that the recent court
successes by the unions in the South will encourage public employee labor
unions to continue to turn to the equal protection clause in their efforts to
secure privileges from state and local governments.

